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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3125 
 ___________ 
 
 ISRAEL PENA ESPARZA, a/ka Rene Pena, a/ka/Izzy Pena, aka Conrad Pena, 
 aka Javier E. Pena, a/k/a Raul Esparza, a/k/a Ruben Garcia, a/k/a Renee Garcia,  
 a/k/a Jose G. Pena, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A008-640-500) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2011 
 Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed :April 1, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Israel Pena Esparza petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his 
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention 
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Against Torture (“CAT”).  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Esparza, a native and citizen of Mexico, was admitted to the United States as a 
lawful permanent resident in 1954.  In October 1996, he was convicted in Texas state 
court of unlawful possession of marijuana and, in 2002, he was convicted of domestic 
assault.  In January 2006, Esparza was convicted in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Texas of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon.  As a result of 
those convictions, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal 
proceedings against Esparza by filing a Notice to Appear, charging him with 
removability under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)] (alien convicted of controlled substance offense); 
INA § 237(a)(2)(C) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C)] (alien convicted of possession of a 
firearm); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] (alien convicted of an 
aggravated felony); and INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii)] [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)] (alien 
convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude).  Esparza conceded 
removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT. 
 At an administrative hearing, the IJ informed Esparza that because his firearms 
conviction constituted a “particularly serious crime,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv), he 
could be considered only for deferral of removal under the CAT.  Esparza then testified  
in support of his CAT application, claiming that, upon his return to Mexico, he will be 
tortured by drug traffickers due to his deceased son’s unpaid debt.  Specifically, he 
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testified that after his son was killed in 1995 in the El Paso, Texas area, he received a 
visit from several unknown individuals who informed him that he had become 
responsible for the payment of his son’s drug debt.   
 Esparza testified that he and his family relocated to another part of Texas shortly 
after the incident.  Although he has not heard from those individuals since that time, he 
remains fearful that he will be harmed.  He testified that he believes that if he is removed 
to Mexico, individuals from El Paso will communicate with members of the same drug 
cartel who live in Mexico, and that they will be instructed to harm him.  Esparza also 
believes that the corrupt police force in the area of Mexico to which he will return, 
Juarez, will be unwilling to protect him. 
 The IJ denied Esparza’s application for deferral of removal under the CAT, 
finding that he was unable to satisfy his burden of proof.  Specifically, he concluded that 
Esparza had not demonstrated that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured upon 
his return to Mexico based on his experience fifteen years earlier in the United States.  
The IJ noted that Esparza could not identify during the hearing who had threatened him 
following his son’s death, but that, in any event, neither he nor his family had been 
contacted in the years since.  The IJ therefore concluded that Esparza’s claim that he 
would be tortured by unknown persons, at the government’s acquiescence, was 
speculative.   
 Esparza timely appealed the decision to the BIA and, on June 29, 2010, the BIA 
dismissed the appeal, concluding that the IJ correctly determined that Esparza was unable 
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to meet his burden of proof under the CAT.  Esparza filed a timely petition for review. 
II. 
 Because Esparza has been convicted of an aggravated felony, a determination he 
does not challenge, our review of the denial of relief under the CAT is limited to 
constitutional claims or questions of law.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) & (D); Pierre v. 
Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc).  Where, as here, the BIA agrees 
with the decision and analysis of the IJ while adding its own reasoning, we review both 
decisions.  See Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 To qualify for deferral of removal under the CAT, an applicant must satisfy the 
same requirements for withholding of removal under the CAT.  See 8 C.F.R. § 
1208.17(a).  That is, he must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he will be 
tortured if removed to the country in question.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).  He must 
also show that the torture will be inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the consent 
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”   
8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.18(a)(1), (7); Silva- Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 70 (3d Cir. 
2007).   
III. 
 Esparza first argues that the IJ and BIA overlooked the fact that he identified in his 
asylum application the Juarez drug cartel as the group that seeks to harm him.  He claims 
that as a result of that error, they improperly concluded that he was unable to identify 
who he believes will harm him upon his return to Mexico.  We find Esparza’s argument 
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unpersuasive. 
 Although it is true that Esparza indicated in his asylum statement that his son was 
friends with members of the Juarez drug cartel, during the administrative hearing he 
admitted that he did not know who approached him following his son’s funeral – “[it] 
was some people I don’t even know, some, some young.  They were about my son’s age, 
27, 28.  I didn’t even know the people . . .”  See Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 123.  
Esparza did not mention the Juarez cartel during his hearing, explaining only that he did 
not know who had approached him and that he had not had any contact with those 
persons in the years since.  We perceive no error in the agency’s decision to give 
credence to Esparza’s testimony. 
 Esparza also argues that the IJ applied the wrong standard of review in assessing 
his claim for deferral of removal under the CAT.  Specifically, he claims that the IJ 
incorrectly applied the “more likely than not,” standard instead of the proper “willful 
blindness” standard.  See Pet. Br. at 4.  Esparza appears to overlook the fact that these 
standards apply to different elements of the CAT claim.  As indicated above, 8 C.F.R. § 
1208.16(c)(2) sets forth the overall controlling standard: the burden is on the applicant 
“to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to 
the proposed country of removal.”  The term “torture” is defined by 8 C.F.R. § 
1208.18(a)(1) which requires, among other things, severe pain or suffering which “is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
or other person acting in an official capacity.”  “Willful blindness” is a means of 
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satisfying the acquiescence test, see Silva-Rengifo., 473 F.3d at 69, but is not a substitute 
for the “more likely than not standard.”   
 Esparza has not demonstrated that the IJ applied the wrong standard of review.  
Indeed, the IJ carefully set forth the proper standard in his decision, see A.R. 57-59, and 
there is no evidence to suggest that he misapplied the standard for showing government 
acquiescence.1
                                                 
1 Esparza also argues that the IJ improperly failed to shift the burden of proof to 
the Government once he “established past persecution when his son was killed.”  
See Pet. Br. at 4.  However, the IJ made no such finding regarding past 
persecution.  We further reject his argument that the IJ violated his due process 
rights by failing to make a credibility determination as required under 8 C.F.R. § 
1208.13.  Id.  That regulation pertains to asylum eligibility.  As noted, the IJ 
determined that Esparza was ineligible for asylum, and he does not dispute that 
determination. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
